|
Francis Fukuyama's criticism of the Iraq
war put him at odds with neo-conservative friends both within
and outside the Bush administration. Here he explains how,
in its decision to invade Iraq, the Bush administration
failed in its stewardship of American foreign policy. First,
the administration wrongly made preventive war the central
tenet of its foreign policy. In addition, it badly misjudged
the global reaction to its exercise of "benevolent
hegemony." And finally, it failed to appreciate the
difficulties involved in large-scale social engineering,
grossly underestimating the difficulties involved in establishing
a successful democratic government in Iraq.
Fukuyama explores the contention by the
Bush administration's critics that it had a neo-conservative
agenda that dictated its foreign policy during the president's
first term. Providing a fascinating history of the varied
strands of neoconservative thought since the 1930s, Fukuyama
argues that the movement's legacy is a complex one that
can be interpreted quite differently than it was after the
end of the Cold War. Analyzing the Bush administration's
miscalculations in responding to the post-September 11 challenge,
Fukuyama proposes a new approach to American foreign policy
through which mistakes might be turned around -- one in
which the positive aspects of the neo-conservative legacy
are joined with a more realistic view of the way American
power can be used around the world.
Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz
Professor of International Political Economy and director
of the International Development Program at the School of
Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University.
He has written widely on political and economic development,
and his previous books include The End of History and
the Last Man, a best seller and the winner of the Los
Angeles Times Book Prize.
|
